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Laws of War: The Developing Law
of Armed Conflict -
Some Current Problems
by General Walter Reed*
INTRODUCTION
E ARLY LAW did not impose many rules on a military com-mander limiting the manner in which he carried out his
combat operations. Pillage was a recognized practice. Enslave-
ment of victims was looked upon as an accepted fate for the
vanquished. It was not considered unreasonable to plunder, rob,
or enslave someone that you had the right to kill. These so-called
rights to plunder, rob, and murder the enemy have been abolished
by certain humanitarian* considerations, practiced and now codi-
fied in international conventions currently recognized by the
civilized nations of the world.
Since the mid 1800's, there have been significant initiatives to
develop the humanitarian aspects of the law of armed conflict.
The Lieber Code, which President Lincoln promulgated during
the U.S. Civil War, had a major impact on the development of
international humanitarian law.' The establishment of the Inter-
national Committee of the Red Cross in 1863 and the conclusion
of the first Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condi-
tion of the Wounded in Armies in the Field on August 22, 1864,2
formed a foundation on which to widen the scope of legal pro-
tections to cover other fields affected by combat operations.
Built on that foundation were numerous conferences which sought
* Brigadier General Walter D. Reed is currently the Assistant Judge Advo-
cate General of the Air Force and is a member of the U.S. delegation to the
Diplomatic Conference on the Development and Reaffirmation of Humanitarian
Law Applicable in Armed Conflict. The views expressed in this article must
be considered solely as those of the author. They do not purport to promulgate
or voice the views of The Judge Advocate General, USAF; the Department of
the Air Force; nor any other Department or Agency of the Government of the
United States.
I General Order 100, Apr. 24, 1863, reprinted in D. SCHINDLER & J. TOMAN,
THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 3 (1973).
2 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
in Armies in the Field, Aug. 22, 1864, HANDBOOK OF THE INT'L RED CROSS 7-8
(1971).
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to serve the interest of humanity and the progressive needs of
civilization. The objectives were not only to relieve the suffer-
ings of the sick and wounded in the field, but also to formulate
and codify accepted practices to govern military operations.
The period that followed World War II has been marked by
many wars of various intensities. Some have spanned decades,
and were of both a bilateral and a multilateral character. These
conflicts have shattered the hopes and expectations of the world
community that the wisdom of the U.N. Charter, constructed on
the experience of the League of Nations and the Paris Pact, would
somehow eliminate or reduce the armed conflicts which threaten
the peace of the world. It became apparent to the world com-
munity that conflicting interests of the highest priorities resulted
in situations where armed conflict could not be averted.
International humanitarian law, applicable in armed conflict,
consists, for the most part, of the four Geneva Conventions of
1949 For the Protection of War Victims, 3 the Hague Conventions
of 1907,4 and the customary law. Efforts to update this body of
law were given impetus by resolutions adopted at the XXth and
XXIst International Conferences of the Red Cross, held re-
spectively in Vienna in 1965, and in Istanbul in 1969.5 Addi-
tionally, the United Nations General Assembly by resolution in
19696 asked the Secretary General, in consultation with the In-
ternational Committee of the Red Cross, to do two things: First,
3 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, [1956] 6 U.S.T. 3114,
T.I.A.S. No. 3362 (hereinafter cited as GWS or the First Convention); Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Ship-
wrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, [1956] 6 U.S.T.
3217, T.I.A.S. No. 3363 (hereinafter cited as GWS-SEA or the Second Con-
vention); Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, [1956] 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364 (hereinafter cited as
GPW or Third Convention); Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, [1956] 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S.
No. 3365 (hereinafter cited as GC or the Fourth Convention).
4 Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land [and Annexed Regulations], Oct. 18, 1907, [1910] 36 Stat. 2227, T.S. 539
et seq.
5 Resolution XXVIII, Protection of Civilian Populations against the Danger
of Indiscriminate Warfare, XXth INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF THE RED CROSS,
VIENNA, OCT. 1965, RESOLUTIONS 21, 22 (1965); Resolution XIII, Reaffirmation
and Development of the Laws and Customs Applicable in Armed Conflicts,
XXIst INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF THE RED CROSS, Istanbul, Sept. 1969,
RESOLUTIONS 10 (1969).
6 G.A. Res. 2597, 24 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 30, at 62, U.N. Doc. A/7630
(1969).
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to study steps for better application of or compliance with existing
law, and second, to study the need for new agreements to better
protect civilians and prisoners, and prohibit the use of certain
methods and means of warfare.
The International Committee of the Red Cross took the lead
and sponsored conferences of government experts. They de-
veloped draft protocols which would redefine and supplement
the 1907 Hague Regulations and the 1949 Geneva Conventions.
The draft protocols were forwarded to the Government of Switzer-
land. The Swiss Government convened the Diplomatic Con-
ference on the Reaffirmation and Development of Humanitarian
Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts to consider the draft proto-
cols. 7  Three sessions of the conference have been held and a
fourth will convene in March 1977.
The development and formulation of rules in a multilateral
conference attended by over 120 nations is a monumental under-
taking. The problems associated with efforts to identify that com-
mon element of mutuality of interest were complicated by several
factors which would seriously impede the work of the conference.
The first factor was the sheer breadth of the draft protocols.
They included not only humanitarian protection for innocent vic-
tims, but also applied to all conventional means and methods of
warfare on land or involving targets on land. The draft included
provisions on the treatment of prisoners of war; the status and
protection of civil defense personnel; limitations on attacks on
dams, dikes, and nuclear power plants; restrictions on environ-
mental warfare; the punishment of war criminals; the protection
of medical personnel and facilities; prohibitions on crop destruc-
tion; measures in relief; the protection of cultural objects; the
protection of medical transports and aerial transports; and re-
strictions on the use of certain weapons, such as napalm.
The difficulties in dealing with the broad scope of the draft
agreements were aggravated not only by the number of countries
7 I.C.R.C., DRAFT ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF
AUG. 12, 1949 (1973). The Diplomatic Conference was charged with examining
two draft additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949:
- draft additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and re-
lating to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts;
- draft additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949,
and relating to the protection of victims of non-international con-
flicts.
[N.B.: All references to provisions of the draft Protocols in this article will be to
the Protocol relating to the protection of victims of international armed con-
flicts.]
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involved, but also by the vast disparity in the experience and
knowledge of the subject matter among the various delegations.
A majority of countries represented had no advisors experienced
or knowledgeable in combat operations.
The law of armed conflict is unique in several aspects. It
does not come into effect until other legal procedures have been
abandoned, and unless the issue involved is of such fundamental
importance that the parties will resort to force as a means of self-
help. To secure general acceptance and practical compliance with
rules applicable in armed conflict, such rules must provide an ac-
ceptable balance of mutual interest for the parties to the conflict.
One aspect of that mutual interest is that the rules must be
reasonable in their terms and practical in their application in
actual combat operations. Failure to take into account the realities
of combat may result in humanitarian rules which are largely
ignored. Certain articles of the 1923 Draft Hague Rules of Air
Warfare8 are good examples. For example, Article 24(3) pro-
vided that, " . . . the bombardment of cities, towns, villages,
dwellings or buildings not in the immediate neighborhood of the
operations of land forces is prohibited." 9
Some delegates to the Conference tended to equate war with a
contest in which there must be a fair balance of power. For ex-
ample, at the first session of the Diplomatic Conference in 1974, a
delegate from one developing country suggested that there should be
an article which would prohibit the use of air power by a party to
a conflict, if that party were superior militarily, economically, or
technologically to its enemy. It is apparent that because many
countries sent representatives with no practical experience or train-
ing in the realities of warfare, the work of the Conference pro-
ceeded more slowly than it otherwise would have. The preliminary
work of the Conference took place primarily in the 1969-1973 pe-
riod. Consequently, the Vietnam War had a particularly dispro-
portionate effect on the first session of the Diplomatic Conference.
Representatives from countries who sought to criticize the practices
in Vietnam introduced provisions on the use of napalm and defoli-
ants, and restrictions on bombardment, especially in free fire
zones or jungle areas. The Vietnam syndrome seems to be dimin-
ishing and the Conference seems more inclined to develop humani-
8 Draft Hague Rules of Air Warfare, 1923. For full text, see M. GREENSPAN,
THE MODERN LAW OF LAND WARFARE 650 (1959). The rules were drafted by
eminent jurists but were never adopted by any country.
9 Supra note 8, at Art. 24(3).
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tarian principles rather than provide for what they perceived to be
the illegal or immoral practices of the last war.
In addition to the wide scope of the draft agreement, the lim-
ited experience of many delegates, and the Vietnam syndrome at
the outset of the Conference, one additional problem slowed the
work of the Conference. It would seem basic that if the law of
armed conflict is to be followed in practice, the obligations that it
imposes must apply without discrimination to all parties to the con-
flict. It has been the U.S. position that the humanitarian rules
for protecting civilians and for carrying out combat operations must
apply equally to all parties to the conflict irrespective of which
party is the unlawful aggressor. It would do no credit to a diplo-
matic conference dedicated to humanitarian principles to formulate
rules permitting one party to the conflict to be less humane or have
a lesser degree of obligation to protect innocent civilians (or com-
batants who are hors de combat) than another party to the conflict.
Nonetheless, the issue of the "just war" continues to be raised at
the Conference. The obvious purpose of the effort is to secure
preferred treatment or exclusive safeguards for liberation move-
ments or others deemed to be fighting against aggression or un-
lawful domination. It is a basic principle, long recognized in all
systems of law, that for there to be any reasonable expectation
of adherence to the law, it must provide that all the rights, duties,
and obligations in the law apply without distinction to all parties
to the conflict.
PRISONERS OF WAR AND THE PROTECTING POWER
U.S. prisoners of war, both in Korea and Vietnam, were denied
humanitarian treatment and prisoner of war rights by their captors.
One of the high priority objectives of the United States in the 1974
Diplomatic Conference was to strengthen the system of Protecting
Powers or their substitutes and ensure that P.W.s received the pro-
tection and treatment required by the 1949 Geneva Prisoner of War
Convention [hereinafter cited as GPW Convention]. 10 The com-
mon articles of the 1949 Geneva Conventions on appointment of
Protecting Powers or substitutes appear to be couched in strong
language and should require no further elaboration." Pictet, in
his Commentary on Article 8 of the 1949 GPW Convention states:
10 Supra note 3.
ii The common articles on Protecting Power or substitutes are Articles 8, 9,
10, and 11 of the first, second, and third Geneva Conventions and Articles 9,
10, 11 and 12 of the fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 3.
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This is a command. . . .The command is addressed in the
first instance to the parties to the conflict. They are bound to
accept the cooperation of the protecting power; if necessary,
they must demand it. In the course of the discussion, there was
ample evidence of the desire of those participating to establish
a stricter control procedure and to make it obligatory.12
The concept of a Protecting Power did not originate with the
Geneva Convention. It is an application of a long-standing prac-
tice where one State (Protecting Power) is instructed or authorized
to safeguard the interest of another State (Power of Origin) in
relation to a third State (Detaining Power). The clear attempts in
the 1949 Geneva Conventions to provide for an obligatory system
for a Protecting Power or substitute failed for two reasons. First,
the Detaining Power could exercise the power of disapproval of a
Protecting Power, citing the second sentence of Article 8 of the
1949 GPW Convention. When a Protecting Power is rejected, an
effort is then made to secure a substitute under Article 10. Para-
graph 3 of Article 10, qualified in its language by the phrase
"Subject to the provisions of this Article," can be read as making
the obligation in that paragraph subject to the first sentence,
which provides that the "high contracting parties may at any time
agree to entrust to an organization . . . the duties incumbent on
the Protecting Powers ... "13 When applied in this manner,
both the acceptance of the International Committee of the Red
Cross or a substitute for the Protecting Power requires consensual
agreement by the parties, and is not, therefore, obligatory. The
second reason for the failure of the obligatory system is related to
the first reason. The Soviet Union and other Eastern bloc coun-
tries can withhold approval of any Protecting Power or substitute.14
This reservation is consistent with the interpretation of Articles 8
and 10 of the 1949 GPW Convention set forth above.
The United States and Western States sought a provision at
12 3 I.C.R.C. LEs CONVENTIONS DE GENEVE Du AOUT 1949; COMMENTAIRE 98
(Pictet ed. 1958).
13 GPW, supra note 3, at Art. 10.
14 The reservation by the USSR to Art. 10 of the first Geneva Convention,
supra note 3, is representative of the reservation made by most Eastern bloc
countries to the provision on Protecting Power:
- Art. 10: The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will not recognize the
validity of requests by the Detaining, Power to a neutral State or to
a humanitarian organization to undertake the functions performed
by a Protecting Power, unless the consent of the Government of the
country of which the protected persons are nationals has been ob-
tained.
[Vol. 9:13
LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT
the 1974 Conference which would ensure that if a Protecting Power
could not be obtained, the parties would'have agreed in advance to
accept the International Red Cross or another humanitarian orga-
nization as a substitute. The Article adopted by the Conference
Committee falls short of requiring advance consent for such a sub-
stitute if no other Protecting Power could be agreed upon. The
requirement for consent, before a Protecting Power or a substitute
can act, remains. However, the proposal does provide for a more
detailed appointment system, which, if adopted, will make it more
difficult for a party to the conflict to reject a Protecting Power or
substitute.
THE PRINCIPLE OF DISTINCTION
The principle has developed that attacks are to be directed at
combatants and military objectives; that civilians should not be the
object of attack and should be spared as much as possible from
the risk and dangers of combat. In January 1969, the United
Nations General Assembly enunciated that principle when it unani-
mously adopted Resolution 244, which states as follows:
a. That right of the parties to a conflict to adopt the means
of injuring the enemy is not unlimited;
b. That it is prohibited to launch attacks against the civilian
population as such; and
c. That a distinction must be made at all times between
persons taking part in the hostilities and members of the civil-
ian population to the effect that the latter be spared as much
as possible.s
The United States has expressly declared that it regards this resolu-
tion as an accurate declaration of existing customary law. The
manner in which lawful combatants comply with the "rule of dis-
tinction" by their own appearance is set out in Article 4 of the
1949 GPW Convention. Except for a Levee en Masse, the comba-
tants must wear a distinctive sign recognizable at a distance and
carry arms openly.i6
In practical application, the penalty which now may be imposed
on a combatant for failure to distinguish himself from civilians in
15 G.A. Res. 2444 (XXIII), 23 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 18, at 50, U.N.
Doc. A/7218 (1969). See Rovine, Contemporary Practice of the United States Re-
lating to International Law, 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 118, 122-125 (1973) (quoting DoD,
General Counsel letter to the effect that Resolution 2444 is "declaratory of exist-
ing customary international law.").
16 GPW, supra note 3, at Art. 4(A).
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combat operations is that upon capture he is not entitled to P.W.
status, and he loses the immunity usually accorded combatants
for acts of violence in combat. Many representatives at the
Diplomatic Conference sought to liberalize the conditions and re-
quirements that must be met in order to obtain P.W. status (cur-
rent requirements are set out in Article 4 of the 1949 GPW Con-
vention). This effort to liberalize the requirements was primarily
for the benefit of guerrillas or members of resistance movements
in occupied territories. The proposals made by advocates of lib-
eralization directly raise the issue of whether and to what degree a
combatant carrying out combat operations is required to distinguish
himself from civilians in order to be a P.W. upon capture, and
avoid individual responsibility for his acts of combat. Some
States were of the view that there should be no requirement for
uniforms or a distinctive sign for members of resistance or liber-
ation movements. It was further advocated that guerrillas in oc-
cupied territory should not be required to disclose their comba-
tant status except during actual military operations. The represen-
tatives at the Conference were overwhelming in their support for
eliminating the apparent ambiguity in Article 4(A) of the 1949
GPW Convention and for stating a single standard of qualifica-
tion for P.W. status which would be applied to both regular and
irregular members of the armed forces.i7 It remains to be deter-
mined what standard, or requirement, or manner of distinction
from civilians will be agreed upon. Indeed, whether a change in
the provisions of Article 4(A) of the 1949 GPW Convention can
be agreed upon at all remains to be determined. The purpose of
the requirement, obviously, is to protect the civilian population by
deterring combatants from concealing their identity and feigning
civilian noncombatant status in order to gain advantageous posi-
tions for an attack. Of course, the failure to distinguish puts the
civilian at great risk. It is understandable that if a soldier cannot
tell whether the person he sees is an enemy combatant subject
to attack or a civilian to be protected, the safety of civilians will
17 Id. Article 4(A) provides in separate subparagraphs for three categories
of combatants: 1) Members of the armed forces; 2) members of other militias,
and; 3) volunteer corps including resistance movements, and the lev& en masse.
For members of regular armed forces there are no specified conditions to be
fulfilled to be eligible for P.W. status upon capture; see 4(A)(1). The absence
of the specific conditions requiring a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a
distance and carrying arms openly has been cited as constituting a double
standard between regular armed forces and guerrillas or members of resistance
movements.
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be seriously jeopardized. It is fundamental that if the armed forces
are to give meaning to the protected status conferred on civilians,
there must be an expectation that persons who look like civilians
will act like civilians, and not use their appearance to gain ad-
vantage in carrying out attacks. To deter such conduct, it is vital
that the law deny the privileged P.W. status to combatants who
do not distinguish themselves from civilians in their military oper-
ations. In addition, and equally important, the law should render
them individually responsible for committing acts of combat in viola-
tion of the laws of war. In summary, any attempt to liberalize
the rule of distinction, by increasing the practical availability of
P.W. status for guerrillas or members of resistance and liberation
movements, will result in some increased risk to civilians and the
civilian population. Hopefully, representatives at the Conference
can reach a compromise which satisfies the needs of captured
guerrillas and members of liberation and resistance movements
without jeopardizing basic protections for civilians.
THE RULE OF PROPORTIONALITY
There are two basic rules necessary to reduce civilian casualties
in combat operations to the maximum extent feasible. The first
is the rule of distinction briefly discussed in the preceding para-
graphs. This rule requires an attacking force to separate comba-
tants and military objectives from civilians and civilian objects,
and direct the attack only against the former. The second is a rule
often called the "rule of proportionality."i8 It recognizes that in
directing attacks at military objectives, civilian casualties and dam-
ages to civilian objects, although regrettable, may occur. The
application of the rule requires the exercise of subjective judgment
on the part of responsible combatants. If they find that the antici-
pated incidental or accidental loss of civilians or civilian property
is disproportionate to the military advantage expected to be gained
by the attack, then the attack must be cancelled. The incidental or
accidental danger to civilians or civilian objects arises from such
factors as their proximity to the military objective, the configura-
tion of the terrain, the relative accuracy of the weapons used, the
existing meteorological conditions, the nature of the military objec-
tive, and the attacking force's technical ability in handling weapons
and delivering ordnances to the target.
IS For a brief discussion, see U.S. AIR FORCE, INT'L LAW - THE CONDUCT OF
ARMED CONFLICT AND AIR OPERATIONS, Pamphlet 110-31, 5-2 & 5-3 (Nov. 19,
1976), and authorities cited therein.
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The debates at the Conference reveal two significant objec-
tions to codifying the rule of proportionality in an international
agreement. The first objection was primarily philosophical. The
rule of proportionality is recognized by many countries as a part of
the law of armed conflict. For those countries that do not recog-
nize it as a rule of law, they must accept it as part of the practical
aspects of military operations. Nonetheless, humanitarians seek-
ing to achieve humanitarian goals in the law of armed conflict
found it difficult to formulate a rule of law which recognized the
lawfulness of civilian casualities in combat operations. The U.S.
representatives at the Conference, although in full accord with
the position that the law cannot authorize attacks directed at civil-
ians, supported the codification of the rule of proportionality.
It was a widely held view that a general affirmative obligation
on the part of combatants to consider in advance the relationship
between incidental civilian losses and expected military advan-
tage, would inure to the benefit of civilians and provide increased
protection. The second objection was to an effort to limit inci-
dental or accidental loss of civilian life or property to the immedi-
ate vicinity of the military objective. The Conference generally
found such limitations impractical in application and rejected such
proposals.
The Conference Committee finally agreed upon a formulation
of the rule of proportionality as follows:
Those who plan or decide upon an attack shall refrain from de-
ciding to launch any attack which may be expected to cause in-
cidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damages to civil-
ian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive
in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage.19
To assure that this provision could not be construed as an author-
ization for attacks against civilians, the Conference Committee,
immediately following the codification of the rule of proportion-
ality, included the following statement: "No provision of this
Article may be construed as authorization for any attacks against
the civilian population, civilians, or civilian objects. '" Should
the Diplomatic Conference adopt the rule of proportionality as
formulated by the Committee, it can be anticipated that there will
19 Proposed 2(a)(iii) of Article 50, Precautions in Attack, adopted by Con-
ference Committee III by a vote of 66 in favor, none against, with 3 abstentions.
For the full text of Article 50 as adopted, see Report of Committee III, Doc.
CDDH/215/Rev. 1, annex.
20 Supra note 19, at Art. 50, 5.
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be varying views as to the meaning of the term "concrete and
direct military advantage." Certainly, it cannot be expected in a
practical application of the rule that any significant military ob-
jective could long be shielded because of anticipated civilian cas-
ualties or losses.
REPRESSION OF BREACHES - EDUCATION AND TRAINING
It is the obligation of each country to ensure that the inter-
national law of armed conflict is observed and enforced by its
armed forces. They are further obligated to establish a system
to prevent violations in armed conflict in which they may be par-
ticipating.' Several methods or systems are available to facilitate
compliance with the law and deter 'its violations. The threat of
some form of punishment or sanction is most often thought of as
the primary method to deter violations of the law. The Military
Justice Codes for most countries include a method for punishing
violations of orders'in combat and the laws and customs of war.21
The parties to the 1949 Geneva Conventions accept an obliga-
tion to enact legislation to provide effective penal sanctions for
persons committing, or ordering to be committed, certain serious
offenses against persons protected by the Conventions. The Con-
ventions recognize *the universal jurisdiction of each High Con-
tracting Party to punish offenders, regardless of their nationality,
and to take necessary measures to suppress all acts contrary to
the Conventions32
Although the threat of punishment is a recognized deterrent
to violations of the law, "preventive law" should be applied to
most effectively prevent violations of the law of armed con-
flict. 23 Applying a preventive law program to combat operations
requires the recognition of three basic factors. First, the inter-
national law applicable to armed conflict must be widely dissemi-
nated to all persons, especially members of the armed forces.
Second, the objectives of the law must be understood (the reduc-
tion of the risk to innocent victims and civilian objects). Third,
adherence to the law must be recognized as consistent with time
21 For example, see 10 U.S.C.. § 890-893, 899-905 (Arts., 90-93 and 99-105 Uni-
form Code of Military Justice).
22 GWS, supra note 3, at Arts. 49-50; GWS-SEA, supra note 3, at Arts. 50-51;
GPW, supra note 3, at Arts. 129-130: and GC, supra note 3, at Arts. 146-147.
23 L. BROWN & E. RUBIN, PREVENTIVE LAW (1950); see also Air Force Regulation
110-27, Oct. 1, 1974, reprinted in Appendix A.
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honored military doctrines, such as economy of force and concen-
tration of effort.
The obligation to disseminate the law is the first and perhaps
the most important factor. Violations can be prevented by a
knowledge of the rules and their origin. This factor has been
recognized in current international agreements. The 1907 Hague
Convention on the Laws and Customs of War on Land provides,
in Article I, that: "The contracting powers shall issue instruc-
tions to their armed land forces which will be in conformity with
the regulation respecting the laws and customs of war on land an-
nexed to the present convention. ' 24  A common article in the
1949 Geneva Conventions provides for dissemination of the texts
for military and civilian instruction, so that the humanitarian
principles may become known to all the armed forces and the
civilian populations of the parties to the conventions.35 Simi-
larly, the draft provision adopted by the cognizant Committee
in the current negotiations in Geneva not only provides for dis-
semination and instruction, but also requires the High Contracting
Parties to report to the Depository of the Conventions and to the
International Committee of the Red Cross every 4 years on the
measures that have been taken to meet their obligations to dis-
seminate and instruct members of the armed forces and the civil-
ian population.2 All countries, including the United States, can
do a better job in carrying out their obligation to inform their
armed forces and populations of the humanitarian principles to
follow during armed conflict.
The second factor in the application of a preventive law pro-
gram requires a program of education and training. The United
States' experience in Vietnam revealed that when alleged combat
offenses in violation of the humanitarian law were investigated,
the individuals involved too frequently asserted that they were
never taught that their alleged conduct was wrong. There is no
question that a large segment of the armed forces does not have
sufficient knowledge of the law to which they must adhere when
24 Supra note 4, at Art. I.
25 GWS, supra note 3, at Art. 47; GWS-SEA, supra note 3, at Art. 48; GPW,
supra note 3, at Art. 127; and GC, supra note 3, at Art. 144.
Proposed 3 of Art. 72, Dissemination, adopted by Conference Committee
I on Apr. 9, 1975, by a vote of 49 in favor, none against, and 10 abstentions.
It should be noted that after Art. 72 was adopted the 10 countries abstaining on
the vote stated that they did so in opposition to 3 which provides for the
report every 4 years on measures to disseminate and instruct. For the text of
Art. 72 as adopted, see Report of Committee I, Doc. CDDH/219/Rev. 1, 135.
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called upon to carry out combat operations. The improved pro-
grams which are now being carried out in all services indicate
that members of the armed forces want to know more about the
law and how problems can be avoided.27
An essential element of successfully reducing or avoiding viola-
tions of the law of armed conflict is the willingness and the abil-
ity of the officers and men of the armed forces to apply the law
under the stress of combat operations. An awareness of the con-
sistency of the law of armed conflict to recognized military prin-
ciples provides, in my view, essential support for compliance with
the law, and is not dependent on the somewhat emotional reac-
tion to the manner of compliance by the enemy. Identifying
the object being attacked as a military objective requires sound
target intelligence. Military effectiveness requires that the target
selected and the risk undertaken be militarily worthwhile. The
need to conserve vital resources is apparent. Traditional military
principles such as economy of force, concentration of effort, tar-
get selection for maximization of military advantage, accuracy in
delivery, and conservation of resources all encourage observance
of the requirement that attacks be directed at military objectives
and that feasible precautions be taken to avoid or minimize inci-
dental civilian casualties.
The close relationship between military effectiveness and the
observance of the International Law of Armed Conflict must be
emphasized. An armed force that is disciplined, well trained, and
fighting efficiently in accordance with the traditional military
principles and doctrines, will not usually violate the law. It is
the undisciplined, ineffective or uncontrolled use of force that more
frequently raises problems. The element that distinguishes a
nation's armed forces from an armed mob is that the armed forces
are regulated and controlled, and act for public purposes in the
service of the nation. The major element of that control is disci-
pline. Discipline means leadership, purpose, organization, and
above all, the use. of controlled or regulated force. Discipline
and control are not only indispensable to the effective use of
military force, they are central concepts in the law of armed con-
27 DEP'T OF DEFENSE, Directive No. 5100.77, DoD PROGRAM FOR THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LAW OF WAR (Nov. 5, 1974) (see Appendix B), provides
that the Armed Forces of the United States will comply with the law of war and
will ensure, that programs to prevent violations (including training and dis-
semination) are. instituted and implemented. AFP 110-31, supra note 18, provides
a comprehensive analysis of the current requirements of the law of armed con-
flict.
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flict. Leadership and discipline are, to a large extent, the prod-
uct of education and training. The law of armed conflict must
be an integral part of that training.
CONCLUSION
The current initiatives at the Diplomatic Conference at Geneva
should be applauded and supported. There is no question that
greater efforts can be made to develop the humanitarian rules as
to what is right and what is wrong in combat operations. The
problems associated with the current Diplomatic Conference are
great, but not insurmountable, and progress has been made.
However, success will not be measured solely on whether hu-
manitarian rules are formulated. To be successful, the Confer-
ence must not only formulate humanitarian rules, but also apply
those rules equally to all parties or participants in the conflict;
apply them practically; and apply them so as not to result in mili-
tary advantage to one party or military disadvantage to another
party. If the military practicality of the rules is not taken into
account, the sole monument to the Conference will be idealistic
rules to which diplomats and professors can point, rather than the
monument of less suffering for the innocent victims, improved
humanitarian treatment for the sick, wounded and captured, and
greater justice for the accused offenders.
APPENDIX A
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE AF REGULATION 110-27
Headquarters US Air Force
Washington DC 20330 1 October 1974
Judge Advocate General Activities
PREVENTIVE LAW PROGRAM
This regulation establishes the Air Force Preventive Law Program. It
is a program of problem avoidance through communication. It in-
cludes advising Air Force people of potential legal problems and helping
them to avoid those problems before they arise. This regulation applies
to Air Force military and civilian personnel, worldwide.
1. Air Force Policy. All commanders will establish and actively sup-
port an effective Preventive Law Program in accordance with this regu-
lation. Avoid duplication of preventive law programs at station or base
level, except for supervisory activities.
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2. Program Responsibilities:
a. Under the Chief of Staff, USAF, staff supervision of the Preven-
tive Law Program is assigned to The Judge Advocate General of the Air
Force. He maintains liaison with the American Bar Association and
other civilian bar organizations that he deems advisable.
b. In the office of The Judge Advocate General, the Chief, Pre-
ventive Law and Legal Aid Group (JACA) supervises the program and
furnishes technical guidance.
c. The staff judge advocate of each command exercises staff super-
vision over the program within his command.
d. The staff judge advocate at base level may appoint a preventive
law officer who, under the direction and control of the staff judge advo-
cate, plans, coordinates, operates, and evaluates the Preventive Law Pro-
gram within the command.
3. Program Objectives. The overall Program objective is to improve
the accomplishment of the Air Force mission by the enhancement of
discipline and morale through education and information. The second-
ary objectives are to:
a. Educate and inform Air Force people in such a way that the ob-
jectives of the law may be achieved largely by self-discipline;
b. Persuade Air Force people to- seek professional legal guidance in
learning and exercising their legal rights and obligations;
c. Provide commanders and Air Force people with a broad channel
of communication on the subject of avoiding problems.
4. Methods. The methods used in conducting the Preventive Law Pro-
gram include all means of communication.
a. Oral presentations may include:
(1) Military law seminars.
(2) Commanders' Calls.
(3) Newcomers orientations.
(4) Club and brotherhood meetings.
(5) Family Service Orientations.
(6) Premarital seminars.
(7) Briefings on command emphasis items.
b. Media presentation may include:
(1) Base newspapers.
(2) Installation bulletins.
(3) Unit bulletin boards.
(4) Base radio and television stations, where available.




(4) Flyers and handbills.
5. Military Law Seminars. A large segment of Air Force people do
not know enough about the system of military law under which we live.
A great percentage of these people want to know more. By knowing
more, both the United States Air Force and the individual service mem-
ber benefit. Commanders therefore are encouraged to establish and
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regularly conduct military law seminars. Experience has shown that
these pire most effective when conducted personally by the staff judge
advocate and when attendance at each seminar is limited to about 30
people. The seminars should include all officer and airmen grades.
Separate seminars may be held for officers, senior noncommissioned
officers, and other airmen grades if this method appears more productive.
The seminars should include at least these topics:
a. Comparison of military and civilian judicial systems.
b. Recent reforms in the military justice system.
c. Nonjudicial punishment.
d. Adverse administrative actions.
e. Foreign criminal jurisdiction (limited to bases outside the United
States).
f. Board for Correction of Military Records.
g. Your lawyer - The Judge Advocate.
6. Command Emphasis Items. The Preventive Law Program should
not only assist in avoiding problems in the first instance, but it should
also prevent the recurrence and proliferation of problems that have al-
ready arisen. Thus, when a problem which could widely affect morale
or discipline arises at one of its bases, the major command should assure
that all preventive law methods are used throughout the command for a
brief period to highlight the problem and the measures necessary to avoid
it; and to prevent the proliferation of the problem. This action requires
full communication between staff judge advocates at all levels of com-
mand.
7. Preventive Law Topic List. As an aid to commanders and staff
judge advocates a Preventive Law Topic List is attached as a basic
nonexclusive outline of subjects which may be used in the various Pre-
ventive Law Programs other than military law seminars.
8. Direct Communication Authorized. The Judge Advocate General
of the Air Force and all staff judge advocates are authorized to communi-
cate directly with each other and with appropriate organizations and
persons concerning preventive law matters.
9. Implementation. Commanders will incorporate existing preventive
law programs into the program created by this regulation.
BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
OFFICIAL
JACK R. BENSON, Colonel, USAF
Director of Administration
DAVID C. JONES, General, USAF
Chief of Staff
Attachment 1
Preventive Law Topic List
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2. Results of Trial
B. Criminal Law
1. Unusual Local Offenses
2. Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction (if appropriate)





3. Insurance and jointly held property
,III. Domestic Relations
A. Marriage
1. Rights and duties of spouses
2. Divorce and annulment
B. Dependents
1. Duties to support
2. Adopted and illegitimate children
IV. Commercial Affairs
A. Contracts
1. Rights, duties and enforcement
2. Installment and conditional sales contracts
B. Consumer protection
C. Powers of attorney
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3. Bank Deposits






B. State and Local Taxes
1. Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act
2. Income taxes
3. Estate, gift, and personal property taxes
VII. Servicemen's Rights
A. Retirees
1. Conflict of interest
2. Dual compensation
3. Reports of employment
B. Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act




C. Public Accommodations and Facilities
D. Education
E. Equal Employment Opportunity
IX. Local Laws
A. State and Host Country Laws
1. Traffic and Vehicles
2. Taxes and Residence
3. Criminal Laws
B. Command Regulations and Policies




1. Regulations, Manuals, Policies
2. Labor Unions
3. Amenability to Local Laws
4. Contractor's Employees
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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DIRECTIVE
SUBJECT: DoD Program for the Implementation of the Law
of War (Short Title: DoD Law of War Program)
Refs:
(a) Army Field Manual 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare, July 1956
(b) Naval Warfare Information Publication 10-2, Law of Naval War-
fare, September 1955
(c) DoD Directive 5100.69, "DoD Program for Prisoners of War
and Other Detainees," December 27, 1972
(d) DoD Instruction 5500.15, "Review of Legality of Weapons Un-
der International Law," November 5, 1974
(e) DoD Directive 5000.19, "Policies for the Management and
Control of DoD Information Requirements," June 2, 1971
(f) Hague Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of
War on Land, 18 October 1907
(g) Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 12 August 1949
(h) Geneva Convention for Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 12
August 1949
(i) Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War, 12 August 1949
(j) Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Per-
sons in Time of War, 12 August 1949
I. PURPOSE
This Directive provides policy guidance and assigns responsibilities
within the Department of Defense for a program to insure implemen-
tation of the law of war.
II. PROGRAM OBJECTIVES
Its objectives are to:
A. Ensure that the law of war and the obligations of the United
States Government under that law are observed and enforced by the
Armed Forces of the United States.
B. Ensure that a program, designed to prevent violations of the law
of war, is implemented by the Armed Forces of the United States.
C. Ensure that alleged violations of the law of war, whether com-
mitted by U.S. personnel or enemy personnel, are promptly reported,
thoroughly investigated, and, where appropriate, remedied by corrective
action.
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III. APPLICABILITY
The provisions of this Directive apply to the Office of the Secretary
of Defense, the Military Departments, the Organization of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Defense Agencies, and the Unified and Specified
Commands (hereinafter referred to collectively as "DoD Compo-
nents").
IV. DEFINITION AND SCOPE
A. The law of war encompasses all international law with respect
to the conduct of armed conflict, binding on the United States or its
individual citizens, either in international treaties and agreements to
which the U.S. is a party, or applicable as customary international law.
B. There is excluded from the scope of this Directive that part of
the law of war relating to the acquisition and procurement of weapons
and weapons systems for the armed forces of the United States, which
is the subject of DoD Instruction 5500.15 (reference (d)).
V. POLICY
A. The Armed Forces of the United States will comply with the
law of war in the conduct of military operations and related activities
in armed conflict however such conflicts are characterized.
B. The Armed Forces of the United States will insure that pro-
grams to prevent violations of the law of war to include training and
dissemination as required by the Geneva Conventions (GWS Art. 47
(reference (g)), GWS Sea Art. 48 (reference (h)), GPW Art. 127 (ref-
erence (i)), GC Art. 144 (reference (j)), and by Hague Convention IV
(Art. I) (reference (f)), are instituted and implemented.
C. Violations of the law of war alleged to have been committed by
or against members of, or persons accompanying or serving with, the
Armed Forces of the United States will be promptly reported, thor-
oughly investigated, and, where appropriate, followed by corrective ac-
tion.
D. Violations of the law of war alleged to have been committed
by or against allied military or civilian personnel will be reported through
appropriate command channels for ultimate transmission to appropriate
agencies of allied governments.
VI. RESPONSIBILITIES
A. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve
Affairs) will maintain overall coordination of and monitor the service
plans and policies for training and education in the law of war.
B. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Af-
fairs) will coordinate DoD positions on international negotiations of the
law of war.
C. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) will monitor
the public affairs aspects of the DoD law of war program and provide
public affairs policy guidance as appropriate, to include coordination
with the Department of State on matters of mutual public affairs con-
cern.
D. The DoD General Counsel will provide overall legal guidance
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within the Department of Defense pertaining to the DoD law of war
programs, to include review of policies developed in connection with the
program and coordination of special legislative proposals and other
legal matters with other Federal departments and agencies.
E. The Secretaries of the Military Departments will develop inter-
nal policies and procedures consistent with this Directive in support of
the DoD law of war program in order to:
1. Provide publication, instructions, and training so that the
principles and rules of the law of war will be known to members of
their respective departments, the extent of such knowledge to be
commensurate with each individual's duties and responsibilities.
2. Provide for the prompt reporting and investigation of alleged
violations of the law of war committed by or against members of
their respective departments in consonance with directives issued
pursuant to paragraph VI.H.4. of this Directive.
3. Provide for the appropriate disposition, under the Uniform
Code of Military Justice, of cases involving alleged violations by
persons subject to court-martial jurisdiction of their respective de-
partments.
4. Provide for the central collection of reports and investiga-
tions of violations of the law of war alleged to have been committed
by members of their respective military departments.
5. Insure that programs within their respective departments to
prevent violations of the law of war are subject to periodic review
and evaluation, particularly in light of any violations reported.
F. The Secretary of the Army is designated as the Executive Agent
for the Department of Defense for the administration of the DoD law
of war program with respect to alleged violations of the law of war com-
mitted against U.S. personnel. In this capacity he will act for the De-
partment of Defense in the development and coordination of plans and
policies for the investigation and, subject to the provisions of DoD Direc-
tive 5000.19, collection, recording, and reporting of information related to
enemy violations of the law of war.
G. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will:
1. Provide guidance to the commanders of unified and spec-
ified commands conforming with the policies and procedures con-
tained in this Directive.
2. Insure that a primary point of contact in the Organization
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is designated to handle actions con-
cerning activities under the provisions of this Directive.
3. Issue and review appropriate plans, policies, and directives as
necessary in consonance with this Directive.
4. Insure that rules of engagement issued by unified and spec-
ified commands are in consonance with the law of war.
H. Commanders of unified and specified commands will:
1. Institute necessary programs within their respective com-
mands to prevent violations of the law of war and insure that they
are subject to periodic review and evaluation, particularly in light of
any violations reported.
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2. Implement Joint Chiefs of Staff guidance for the collection
and investigation of reports of enemy violations of the law of war.
3. Designate an authority within the command to supervise the
administration of those aspects of this program dealing with alleged
enemy violations.
4. Issue appropriate plans and directives to insure that war
crimes allegations to which this Directive applies are reported
promptly to the appropriate authorities and investigated.
5. Insure that initial reports and reports of investigation of al-
leged war crimes committed by U.S. personnel are forwarded to
the appropriate military departments.
6. Insure that rules of engagement issued by the command con-
form to the law of war.
I. The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, will provide appro-
priate information from the intelligence community to the Secretary of
the Army and the commanders of unified and specified commands
pursuant to Paragraphs VI.F. and H. above, concerning violations of
the law of war perpetrated against captured or detained United States
nationals.
VII. EFFECTIVE DATE AND IMPLEMENTATION
This Directive is effective immediately. Two copies of implement-
ing documents and notification of designated representatives, in ac-
cordance with Section VI, above, and any revisions, changes or
reissuances of appropriate directives or other documents thereafter,
will be forwarded to the General Counsel and the Assistant Secre-
tary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) within 6 months.
Deputy Secretary of Defense
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